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The European Community-1992 and
Beyond: The Implications of a Single
Europe on Intellectual Property
William J. Keating*
I. Introduction
A. Historical Perspective and Present Situation
For the past forty years, the Western Bloc countries of Europe
have been striving to achieve an integral market structure to pro-
mote cross-border trade. The development of the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC, popularly known as the Common Mar-
ket)1 converted a group of independent countries into a homogeneous
community of over 300 million consumers.'
Western Europe's experience finds a counterpart in the develop-
ment of the cross-border trade between the original American states
in the development of United States commerce. The United States
federal system, which insisted upon freedom of interstate commerce
unfettered by state regulation, developed the internal market which
strengthened American industry at the expense of foreign manufac-
turers. Taking a lesson from United States history, albeit two hun-
dred years later, the European Community (the "EC" is the current
designation for the organization previously known as the EEC) is
seeking to strengthen its internal market, served by business organi-
zations having a presence in the respective member states.
Many international business analysts have a healthy skepticism
regarding the probable success of the endeavor. Certain historical
events, such as Germany's three attempts within the last century to
dominate Europe through military aggression, have engendered a
* Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law, Carlisle, Pennsylvania; B.S., Canisius
College 1946; J.D., Georgetown University 1954. The author wishes to thank Theresa Catino,
Dickinson School of Law, for her assistance.
1. The European Economic Community was created in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome.
See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinaf-
ter Treaty of Rome].
2. The E.C. is comprised of Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom,
Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Portugal. Prior to the
re-unification of Germany the combined population was estimated at 320 million people.
White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, June, 1985.
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certain reluctance to allow the Germans to acquire a dominant posi-
tion through economic strength.
In addition, the disparities between the various countries in
terms of culture, language, political systems, stability, economic
strength, employment, inflation, debt, currency exchange, religion,
social welfare, world trade and similar factors, would suggest that a
single state system could never be achieved. It would seem unlikely
that any of the Common Market countries would relinquish its sov-
ereignty to a supra-national authority comprised of other member
states. The simple response is that they have done so. The willingness
of the European Community countries to abide by the decisions of
the EC Court of Justices is mute testimony that the EC countries
are willing to trade some sovereignty for an opportunity to be a
player in the European market.
Other potential problems include the lack of a common cur-
rency and a common language throughout the Common Market
countries. Not even the wildest optimist expects the adoption of a
single currency or a single language in the near future. However, the
possibility that the EC can exist without a common currency and a
common language is not at all bleak. The EC could adopt a supra-
national currency and allow the currencies of the individual coun-
tries to float against it. Although there is an EC monetary unit, the
ECU, it is merely used as a currency value for calculating certain
regulatory formula and is not available in transferable negotiable in-
struments.4 The absence of a common EC language would appear to
be detrimental to the EC's goal of unification. In reality, the lack of
a common language is not an impediment to unity. Even in certain
sections of the United States, large groups of non-English speaking
residents exist quite comfortably.
B. The Problem
One area involved in the cross-border transfer of goods and
technology is referred to as "intellectual property" (i.e. patents,
trademarks, copyrights and trade secrets). Contrary to conventional
wisdom, there is no international patent, international trademark or
international copyright. Certain treaties do exist that grant recipro-
cal rights to citizens of countries that are signatories to the treaties;
however, each country retains control over the issuance and enforce-
ment of intellectual property rights that it grants. 5
At first glance, the objectives of the Common Market appear to
3. U.P. TOEPKE. EEC COMPETITION LAW 7-12 (1982).
4. J. GOLD, EXCHANGE RATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 146
(1988).
5. See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
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conflict with the current state of intellectual property rights and pro-
cedures. While the member countries are committed to eliminating
impediments to cross-border flow of goods within the Common Mar-
ket, the individual EC countries, however, continue to protect the
intellectual property rights of their residents against importation of
goods that infringe these rights.
For example, assume that the Deutschland Manufacturing
Company has patent protection in Germany on a new laser device
but has no equivalent patent in France. If a competing manufacturer
makes the product in France, may the device be lawfully exported
into Germany? The German patent law says "no," because such ex-
portation would be a violation of the German patent. The EC law
says "yes," because prohibiting export would be contrary to the
spirit and regulations of the European Community.6
This Article will describe some of the inconsistencies between
the EC law and the intellectual property laws of individual member
states. It will also attempt to suggest solutions to resolve the
conflicts.
II. Intellectual Property
A. Patents
Patents are creatures of statutes. Patents do not exist in the
common law.7 Through statutory law governments grant exclusive
rights to inventors who have made a significant advance in the state
of technology. Each government determines the qualifications for is-
suing a patent as well as regulatory procedures for obtaining a pat-
ent. Applicants for a patent must scrupulously adhere to these re-
quirements. Failure to do so may result in denial of the patent grant
or invalidation of the patent if it is granted improperly.'
The absence of extraterritorial effect of patents requires the in-
ventor to file a proper application in each jurisdiction in which he or
she desires patent protection. While patent laws in each country are
similar,9 there is also a certain amount of disparity. A patent issued
in one country might be denied in another country because of the
differences in the patent statutes.
All countries require the common thread of an invention, 6onsti-
tuting a substantial advancement of technology, to justify the grant
of a patent."0 Countries have widely divergent views as to the degree
of the advancement necessary to support a valid patent. While some
6. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 1.
7. P. ROSENBERG. PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 1.02 (1980).
8. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
9. P. ROSENBERG, supra note 7, at 18-1 to -2.
10. Id. § 1.03.
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countries examine the patent application for inventive merit before
granting a patent,11 other countries issue a patent if the application
is presented in the proper form and leave the issue of inventive merit
to a later determination, should the patent be tested in court.12
The disparity of patent laws in Common Market countries re-
suits in a likelihood that certain Common Market countries, having
strict requirements for the grant of a patent, might refuse to grant a
patent on a particular invention, whereas countries with more re-
laxed standards might grant a patent on the same invention. The
patent may not protect the inventor against the importation of the
product from an EC country in which the invention does not qualify
for a patent, as illustrated by the Deutschland Manufacturing Com-
pany example.
1. Types of patents.
a. Product patents.-As the name suggests, product patents
cover new and improved devices, machines, chemical compounds and
other articles of manufacture."3 The patent precludes others from
making, using or selling the patented device within the jurisdiction
of the country issuing the patent. It also precludes the production of
any similar devices embodying the patented concept. 4
b. Process patents.-A process patent protects a new and use-
ful process for making useful products even though the article itself
is old and well-known. 15 A patent also protects a process that makes
an article at less cost, more quickly, or more reliably than other
ways of making the product. 6 Other manufacturers may continue to
make the articles by known methods, but may not use the method
covered by the patent.1 7
2. Exportation of Patented Devices.-The Deutschland Man-
ufacturing Company example of a product lawfully sold in France,
where the inventor does not have patent rights, then exported to Ger-
many, where the inventor has a German "product" patent, exempli-
fies the conflict between the EC objective of free trade and the objec-
tive of protecting intellectual property rights. Because patent rights
have been granted to the inventor, the inventor's patent rights in
Germany should be enforced. The free trade objectives of the EC,
however, are not absolute. Whenever rights of individual or private
11. Id. § 19.01[1t.
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
14. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988).
15. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
16. P. ROSENBERG, supra note 7, § 6.0111].
17. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988).
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organizations confer a benefit on society in general, those rights
should be protected, even at the expense of a minimal intrusion on
the promotion of cross-border trade.
If a new process is used in the manufacture of an old device,
and the process is protected by a patent in Germany but not in
France, should a competitor be permitted to make the device by the
new process in France and then export it to Germany without violat-
ing the inventors's German patent? This hypothetical example seems
to be a variation of the previous example. Considerations involving
process patents are, however, quite different from the scope of pro-
tection offered by product patents. As indicated, patents are a crea-
ture of statute and each country's patents have no extraterritorial
effect. Since the manufacture is legal in France, the exportation to
Germany does not infringe on the rights of the German inventor,
which are limited to protection against use of the new process in
Germany.
3. EC Patents.-Many lawyers and business persons within
the EC favor enactment of a patent statute that would provide for a
single patent, valid throughout the Common Market."8 This statute
would be the equivalent of a United States patent that is valid and
enforceable throughout the United States. While the concept is in-
triguing and the EC has expended considerable effort to pass legisla-
tion designed to create such patent rights, until recently little pro-
gress has been made. There does not seem to be any serious
opposition, merely a lack of substantial support by the governments
of the member states for this concept. Recently, however, the EC has
been in communication with the European Patent Office (EPO)19 re-
garding the EPO's willingness to handle the administrative details of
an EC patent. Should the EPO agree, an EC patent may in fact
become a reality.
4. Patent Licensing in the EC.-While the cross-border trans-
fer of patented goods within the EC creates interesting legal ques-
tions, the scope of patent licensing within the EC creates more diffi-
cult problems. An American company owning equivalent patents in
both France and Germany may desire to license different companies
to penetrate the markets in each of these countries. It may prefer to
license a German company to penetrate the German market and a
French company to represent it in France. Presumably, each com-
18. R. PENNINGTON, EUROPEAN PATENTS AT THE CROSSROADS 3-7 (1975).
19. The European Patent Office was established in Munich, Germany to administer the
European Patent Convention (E.P.C.). Most European countries are party to the E.P.C. The
E.P.C. permits the filing of a single patent application which, if issued, may be registered in all
countries belonging to the E.P.C. See P. ROSENBERG, supra note 7, §§ 19.01-.03.
Winter 19911
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pany would be able to develop the market within its own sphere of
expertise, based upon its familiarity with the language, local distri-
bution, and advertising. May the licensor prohibit, by contract, each
of the licensees from selling goods into another licensee's territory?
It would be very dangerous to do so in view of strong EC prohibi-
tions against the restriction of cross-border transactions. 0 Even in
the United States licensors may grant exclusive licenses to different
licensees in different geographical locations.2 1 A licensee operating
outside of the defined area is considered an infringer. The thrust of
the EC regulation is that once the patent owner distributes the prod-
uct in any EC country, the licensee may further distribute it
throughout the EC without the distribution being considered a viola-
tion of the licensor's patent rights.2
B. Trademarks
1. Property rights.-A trademark is a word or symbol used to
indicate the source of goods or services. 3 Thus the trademark
"IBM" used on computers indicates a product made by the Interna-
tional Business Machine Company. Likewise, the symbol of the
Rock of Gibraltar identifies the Prudential Insurance Company.
Once consumers identify these words or symbols with the source of
the goods or services, the owner acquires a property right in the
trademark. 4 Subject to certain restrictions,25 the trademark owner
may transfer or license the trademark in the same manner as any
other type of personal property. The owner has the right to preclude
others from using the same or similar marks on the same or similar
goods or services.26 A certain difficulty arises in determining the
scope of trademark rights, in view of the intangible nature of trade-
marks. However, this is a concept that courts have dealt with for
years, and courts have developed certain guidelines in defining the
scope of trademark rights."
2. Licensed rights.-Again, the trademark owner may elect to
license the trademark to different licensees in different geographical
areas. Trademark licensing is especially sensitive because of the ne-
cessity that the licensor maintain quality control over the goods
bearing the trademark, which the licensee sells. 8 Failure of the 1i-
20. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 1.
21. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1988).
22. See Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd. v. Terranova Industrie C.A. Kapferer & Co., 1976 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1039, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 482.
23. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988).
24. W. KEATING, FRANCMSING ADvISER § 7.01 (1987).
25. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1988).
26. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1988).
27. W. KEATING, supra note 24, § 7.27.
28. Id. § 5.18.
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censee to maintain a quality product may injure the reputation of
the licensor as well as all other licensees. This quality control is im-
portant in trademark licensing of franchises. A poor reputation by
one franchisee may injure the reputation of all the franchisees.
C. Copyrights
1. Nature of rights.-Copyrights protect authors and artists
from plagiarism of their works. The scope of protection is limited to
artistic and literary works, such as plays, books, songs, statues, mov-
ies,2 9 and to prevention of the "copying" of the artistic or literary
work. 0 A successful suit for copyright infringement requires the
plaintiff to prove that the defendant had access to the plaintiff's
work. 1 The plaintiff must also bear the burden of proving that the
defendant's work was a copy of the plaintiff's work, not just a similar
treatment of a similar theme. 2
2. Copyright Protection
a. Reproduction and distribution rights.-Reproduction and
distribution rights involve the production and sale of copyrighted
works in tangible form, for example, books, records, tapes, paintings,
statues and similar objects embodying copyrighted material. 3
b. Performance rights.-The copyright also protects perform-
ance rights-the rights to perform a play or a movie, even though a
tangible object is not sold or transferred.3' The importance of this
distinction will become apparent in the discussion of transmission of
copyrighted performances across national borders, in which the per-
formance is lawfully received in the first country but not in the sec-
ond country.35
3. International Protection of Copyrights.-While there are
several international treaties protecting copyrights, none of them
provides for extra-territorial effect of a copyright. The major trea-
ties, the Berne Convention of 188836 and the Universal Copyright
Convention of 1952," both grant reciprocal rights to citizens of
countries that are signatories to the respective treaties. All EC coun-
29. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
30. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
31. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1988).
32. Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1984).
33. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
34. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
35. See infra section 4.b.
36. S. RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND
ARTISTIC WORKS 1886-1986 (1987).
37. U.S. ratification occurred in 1954. Act of August 31, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-743, 68
Stat. 1030 (1954).
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tries are, in fact, members of both conventions." These treaties sim-
plify the procedures that are required to obtain copyright protection.
A copyright owner in France is automatically protected in Germany
without having to file an application in Germany. The French copy-
right holder is entitled to the same protection in Germany as are
German citizens.
4. The Problem.-There are two major problem areas in the
field of international copyright. The first is the protection of com-
puter programs. The second is the transmission of copyrighted televi-
sion programs across national borders through satellite transmission.
a. Computer Programs.-A substantial body of law granting
copyright protection for computer programs has developed. The U.S.
has been the leader in the field, treating computer software as the
equivalent of a textbook.3 9 Not all countries agree. Some countries
require the same degree of technological advance to justify copyright
protection of computer programs as they require for protection under
patent laws.40 This attitude restricts protection to a minimal number
of computer programs that involve a significant advance over the
prior art. Germany grants copyright protection for computer pro-
grams, but only for works of extraordinary merit." Thus, computer
software, worth billions of dollars, is subject to the same problems of
patent protection that are described above. Some countries in the EC
protect computer programs, and some do not. 2 Should competitors
be permitted to copy the software in a country where no protection is
available and export it into other countries where protection is avail-
able, under the umbrella of the EC objective of promoting free trade
across international borders?
b. Satellite transmission of copyrighted television pro-
grams.-The ability of the satellite to transmit television programs
over a wide geographical area is well-known. A copyrighted program
can easily be broadcast throughout Germany by means of satellite
transmission. Assume that the program has- international appeal
without the need for translation, for example, a program including
the copyrighted performance of the London Symphony Orchestra.
The copyright owner is entitled to receive a royalty for the use of the
copyrighted work in each country where it is received. Modern tech-
38. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CIRCULAR 38(a), INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (1983).
39. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1988).
40. The German law covering copyright protection for computer programs requires a
substantial technical advance to support copyright protection.
41. Arckins, Obtaining International Copyright Protection for Software: National Laws
and International Copyright Conventions, 38 FED. CoMM. L.J. 283, 291 (1986).
42. Id.
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nology permits the transmission of the broadcast into Austria,
France and Italy, but there are no laws to ensure that a copyrighted
royalty will be paid. While the payment of a royalty would seem to
solve the problem, the copyright owner may prefer to license differ-
ent parties in the respective countries in order to maximize income.
D. Trade Secrets
The concept of trade secrets (also referred to as "know-how,"
"manufacturing data," or "technical assistance") is probably one of
the most important and least understood forms of intellectual prop-
erty rights. To the extent that confidential information is developed
in the manufacturing and vending of commercial products, the com-
pany developing the information is entitled to protection against mis-
use of the information by anyone who acquires the information from
the developing company.4
A practical example of trade secret protection involves a situa-
tion where a patent licensee also receives confidential manufacturing
information to assist in the manufacture of the product line. Assume
that the licensee agrees to hold the information in confidence and not
to use it in a manner inimical to the licensor's best interests. Is the
licensee bound to refrain from using the technology after the main
license agreement terminates? Under the EC regulations, can a cov-
enant not to use the technology received from the licensor prohibit
the licensee from selling products across borders? The tension be-
tween the promotion of cross-border trade conflicts again with the
protection of intellectual property rights."
The concept of trade secret protection appears collaterally asso-
ciated with patent protection. Although both doctrines protect the
investment in developing technology, they are, in fact, unrelated con-
cepts. Trade secret protection may extend to business information
that is not related to technology, such as customer or supplier lists,
or future business planning . 6 Patent protection is limited to techni-
cal improvements of products or processes.' 6 A showing of significant
improvement over the prior art is required to support patent protec-
tion. While trade secret protection may cover significant technical
advances, it may also include low level advances that are important
in the aggregate. 4' The main distinction is that patent protection is
absolute, whereas trade secret protection only protects against dis-
closure by parties who derive the information from the original de-
43. M. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW HANDBOOK § 4.01[3] (1982).
44. U.P. TOEPKE, supra note 3, at 581 n.674.
45. M. JAGER, supra note 43, § 3.01, at 28.
46. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
47. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron, 416 U.S. 470 (1973).
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veloper, or by those in privity with it.46
In a sense trade secret protection and patent protection may be
incompatible. Because the patent is a public document, the informa-
tion it contains may not be subject to trade secret protection. Thus in
some instances, the developer must elect issuance of a patent or, al-
ternatively, rely on trade secret protection.
III. Analysis of Vehicles Used to Penetrate the EC Market
A. Methods Employed to Penetrate the Market
A non-EC company attempting to sell into the EC market may
employ any one of several vehicles to accomplish this objective.
Some of the more important vehicles include:
1. Exportation.-The company may attempt to manufacture
abroad and serve the EC market through exportation of its goods
into the EC.
2. Intellectual Property Licensing.-In exchange for a royalty,
the company may elect to license its intellectual property rights to
one or more companies that are already doing business in a Common
Market country.
3. Franchising.-The company may negotiate a franchise li-
cense agreement with a company doing business in an EC member
state. The franchisee makes and sells the products according to the
franchisor's specifications, and pays a royalty to the franchisor.
4. Joint Venture.-The company may set up a subsidiary in a
Common Market country, with the subsidiary being partially owned
by a local company already having a presence in the EC.
5. European Economic Interest Grouping.-The EC has re-
cently developed the concept of the EEIG' 9 in order to create a busi-
ness enterprise that is governed by Community law rather than by
the laws of a particular member state. While it is subject to some
limitations,"0 the EEIG is useful in developing joint ventures between
partners from different member states or with non-EC organizations
that have a presence in the EC. Because the concept of EEIG's did
not become effective until July 1, 1989,"1 there is limited experience
with this business form; and the regulations governing EEIG's have
48. See generally M JAGER, supra note 43, § 5.04.
49. See Donald, Company Law in the European Community: Toward Supranational
Incorporation, 9 DICK. J. INT'L L. 1 (1990). See also Council Regulation of July 25, 1985 on
the European Economic Interest Grouping, 28 O.J. EUR. COMm. (No. L 199) 1 (1985).
50. The EEIG is limited to a maximum of 500 employees and may not borrow on finan-
cial markets or be used as a holding company. See generally Donald, supra note 49.
51. Id.
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not been interpreted. However, the EEIG is an option that businesses
should consider for EC penetration.
6. Wholly-Owned Subsidiary.-The company may establish a
subsidary in an EC country, and retain full ownership of the
subsidiary.
B. Considerations in Selecting a Suitable Vehicle
1. Exportation.-Direct selling into an EC country involves
the lowest financial commitment. Except for transportation and tar-
iffs, the administrative costs of selling goods directly to the customer
in an EC country are fairly low. They are also limited to a transac-
tional basis, so there is no long-term commitment of funds. In the
event that the transaction is unsuccessful, the seller can withdraw
with a minimum of expense. The seller who chooses direct sale also
has the least amount of presence in the foreign market. The seller
does not commit assets or personnel to the venture, and may avoid
local liability or local taxes levied against the enterprise.
The disadvantage is that direct selling is the least successful
way of penetrating a foreign market. Unless the seller has a good
relationship with a large customer in the foreign country who will
purchase in volume and handle administrative details, it is difficult
for the seller to penetrate a foreign market through direct sales.
2. Intellectual Property Licensing.-Negotiating an agree-
ment with an enterprise in a Common Market country that has the
capability of manufacturing and selling a product enables the licen-
sor to collect a royalty for all foreign sales without investment or
presence in the foreign country. An acceptable royalty rate will be
considerably less than the level of profit the licensor traditionally
would realize through manufacture and sale. The licensor must also
have solid intellectual property protection on the product line: If the
patent is protected in one Common Market country, the licensee
cannot be prohibited from selling the product in other Common
Market countries.
3. Franchising.-Product distribution through franchising has
become quite popular in the United States and is presently spreading
throughout the rest of the world. 2 Major franchisors such as Mc-
Donald's, Kentucky Fried Chicken, and Holiday Inn are employing
franchise systems to penetrate foreign markets.5" The franchise sys-
tem is essentially a trademark and trade secret license. The licensee
operates under the umbrella of the trademark, presenting the ap-
52. W. KEATnNG, supra note 24, § 12.01.
53. Id. §§ 12.12E, 12.16A (Supp. 1990).
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pearance of being a branch of the parent company. The franchisee
is, in fact, totally independent of the franchisor, except for the con-
tractual relationship created by the franchise agreement. The
franchisor specifically disavows any liability for the activities of the
franchisee. The franchisor is thus able to penetrate foreign markets
through contractual control over the franchisee, without subjecting
itself to the jurisdiction of the foreign government. 4
4. Joint Venture/European Economic Interest Grouping.-If
the enterprise shares manufacturing and distribution with a local
company, it increases the expected return on investment. While the
return would not be as great as profits realized from direct sales, the
profits would still be considerably higher than the royalty rate gener-
ated by licensing.5 5 The difference in profits is justified by the exper-
-tise that a joint venture acquires through a partnership with an EC
company that has experience dealing in the Common Market.5
The disadvantage is that the non-EC company acquires a degree
of presence in the EC country. To the extent that the joint venture
owns assets or hires employees in the EC country, it subjects itself to
that country's jurisdiction. Certain liabilities such as taxes, labor
regulations, and jurisdiction for civil or criminal actions attach. In
addition, the non-EC company must rely very heavily on the foreign
partner for success.
5. Wholly-Owned Subsidiary.-The benefit of the wholly-
owned subsidiary is an increased expectation of profit for the corpo-
ration. The manufacturer also has more control over decisions deal-
ing with the operation of the business, and need not defer to its local
partner. With control and increased profits come increased presence.
All capital investments, equipment, property, bank accounts, and
personnel necessary to operate the business are subject to attachment
in the event of civil or criminal litigation.
6. Miscellaneous.-The wide variety of vehicles for penetrat-
ing foreign markets include brokers, manufacturer's representatives,
agents, and sales offices. Many of them are variations of the vehicles
described above. In general, the deeper market penetration a com-
54. Id. § 12.01, at 366.
55. See generally Lake, Foreign Business Organizations, in THE LAW OF TRANSNA-
TIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS §§ 2.01-.03 (V. Nanda ed. 1981); see also Bard & Peters,
International Technology Transfer Agreements, in THE LAW OF TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS §§ 6.01-.02 (V. Nanda ed. 1981).
56. See generally Donald, supra note 49; 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 199) 1 (1985).
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pany desires, the greater its exposure to foreign jurisdiction.
C. The Problems Created by these Vehicles
1. Exportation.-The problem created by the exportation of a
patented product to any EC country is that the product may be re-
sold in any other Common Market country. In spite of the fact that
the American Manufacturing Company, Inc. has patents in both
Germany and France, the lawful sale of a product exhausts any fur-
ther rights the patent owner of that product may have in other Com-
mon Market countries. The activity, known as "parallel importa-
tion," illustrates the precedence of unimpeded cross-border trading
over local intellectual property rights.5 7
2. Intellectual Property Licensing.-The major problem in
regulating intellectual property rights in the Common Market in-
volves the right of the owner of such property to restrict distribution
of products covered by such rights, either by territory or by alloca-
tion of customers or field of use. For a variation of the previous ex-
ample, assume that the American Manufacturing Company, Inc. has
developed a new laser device and has issued patents in both France
and Germany, as well as in the United States. Further assume that
it has licensed La France S.A. as its exclusive licensee in France and
Deutschland G.m.b.H. as its exclusive licensee in Germany. Ameri-
can Inc. would prefer to restrict sales by La France S.A. to custom-
ers residing in France and prohibit exportation to Germany. It would
also like to restrict sales by Deutschland G.m.b.H. to German cus-
tomers and preclude exportation to France, without violating any
regulations governing restrictive trade practices in either country.
This arrangement would provide for orderly marketing and maxi-
mum sales penetration in each country.
The nature of intellectual property rights allows for this ar-
rangement, without specifically requiring the licensees to restrict
sales to designated territories. Since La France S.A. is not licensed
under the German patent to sell lasers covered by the patent in Ger-
many, such sales would constitute infringement of the licensor's Ger-
man patent.5 8 Sales by the German licensee into France would like-
wise constitute infringement of the French patent.5 9 Thus the
licensor would be able to restrict the sales territory of its licensees,
and avoid using restrictive covenants that are inconsistent with the
Common Market objective of complete freedom of cross-border
marketing.
57. See also K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988), for a discussion of
.parallel importation."
58. See generally Treaty of Rome, supra note 1.
59. Id.
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Applying the regulations of the Treaty of Rome60 (the basis for
the EC) requires a different analysis. If the licensor controls a signif-
icant share of the market, then enforcement of the patent rights to
restrict cross-border trade could be considered abuse of a dominant
position and, therefore, enforcement is in violation of the EC regula-
tions."1 Activities that are otherwise lawful may be considered un-
lawful, when implemented by firms that have a dominant position in
the market place and seek to extend their control over cross-border
trading.62
Even if the licensor does not hold the dominant position in the
market share of the patented products, enforcement of the patent
rights distorts competition and could violate article 85 of the Treaty,
which contains a broad prohibition against restricting trade. 3 This
interpretation is, however, inconsistent with article 222, which states:
"This Treaty shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States
governing the system of property ownership."' " Article 36 states that
regulations prohibiting restrictions on exports or imports shall not
apply to restrictions intended to protect industrial or commercial
property.6 5 However, such restrictions may not constitute arbitrary
discrimination or disguised restraints of trade.6 Since Germany has
the authority to prohibit the importation of devices which infringe
German patents, the fact that the device was lawfully made in
France under a French patent should not compel a different result.
Conversely, the French government has authority to enforce its pat-
ent laws.
One advantage of the Treaty is that activities that restrict cross-
border trade may be exempt from the reach of the Treaty if the
Commission responsible for interpreting the rules determines that
the pro-competition effect outweighs the negative effect. 7 The Com-
mission may grant an individual exemption to specific petitioners,
upon a proper showing that the activity promotes trade and has only
a minimal restrictive effect.6 8
If a significant number of members of the industry petition for
an exemption, the Commission may grant a "block" exemption.6 9 In
this situation, the Commission sets forth the guidelines for the ex-
60. Id.
61. Id. art. 86.
62. Id.
63. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 85.
64. Id. art. 222.
65. Id. art. 65.
66. Id. art. 36.
67. Id. art. 85(3).
68. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 85(3).
69. KEATnNG, supra note 24, § 12.11, at 396.
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emption.70 All industry members operating within the guidelines are
automatically exempt.7 1 Requests for individual exemptions and
block exemptions are published before a decision is reached. Inter-
ested members of the public are invited to comment on the effect of
the exemption."
3. Franchising.-The legal validity of restrictive covenants is
well-developed in the EC. The leading case of Pronuptia of Paris
GmbH, Frankfurt am Main v. Rosalinde Iringard Schillgalio73 in-
volved a French franchisor who had a number of franchisees in
France and Germany that were engaged in selling wedding dresses
and related items. The franchise agreement limited the activities of
the franchisees, and gave the franchisor control over every aspect of
the business. The agreement prohibited sales outside of the assigned
territory; in exchange, it granted the franchisees the right to use the
franchisor's trademark. A franchisee stopped paying royalties but
continued to use the trademark. The franchisor brought suit for past
royalties and trademark infringement .7 The franchisee defended on
the basis that the agreement was unenforceable because it prevented
cross-border sales and, therefore, was contrary to the Treaty of
Rome.
The court of first instance (trial court) ruled for the defend-
ant, 6 and held that the agreement did indeed violate the Treaty of
Rome and was unenforceable. The Federal Court (court of appeals)
certified the issue to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The ECJ
held that although some of the terms and conditions of franchise
agreements may have a restrictive effect, the overall benefit of
franchise distribution outweighed the disadvantages.7 The Court
tested the individual clauses in the agreement to ascertain which
clauses were justified in promoting competition. 8
The nature of a franchising system results in a marketing ar-
rangement that is inherently inconsistent with the EC objectives of
permitting free trade across borders. The franchisor grants each
franchisee an exclusive marketing area, with the stipulation that the
franchisees will not sell outside of their respective market areas. This
is contrary to the EC objective of permitting any enterprise in a
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. § 12.11, at 397-98.
73. Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgallis, 1986 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 353, [1986] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 414.
74. W. KEATnNG, supra note 24, § 12.11.
75. Id.
76. Id. § 12.10, at 382-83.
77. Id.
78. Id.
Winter 19911]
68 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Common Market country to sell to any customer in the EC. 9
Subsequently, a number of franchisors submitted a request for
exemptions8" and the Commission granted exemptions, provided that
the franchisors conformed their franchise agreements to the decision
in Pronuptia.8' Eventually, the Commission published a block ex-
emption for franchise distribution that set forth the guidelines for
approval.82
4. Joint Venture.-Assuming that the American Manufactur-
ing Company, Inc. wishes to develop its foreign markets through a
joint venture with La France S.A. in France and Deutschland
G.m.b.H. in Germany, a separate company "Amerfrance S.A."
would be incorporated in France. It would be owned jointly by
American Manufacturing Company, Inc. and La France S.A. The
American Manufacturing Company could transfer its French rights
in intellectual property to Amerfrance, along with whatever contri-
bution of capital might be necessary to operate the company success-
fully. La France could also make its contribution of capital, along
with any other assets named in the joint venture agreement. The
companies would agree to their respective ownership shares, pay-
ment of dividends, structure and duties of management, amendment
of by-laws, and even provisions for dissolution of the joint venture.
The American partner might prefer that products made in-
France be sold only in France, so that it would be able to develop
other foreign markets through similar joint ventures with other part-
ners. The American company may wish to develop a separate joint
venture with a German partner. The French partner might object to
any restrictions that would limit its ability to maximize sales, espe-
cially the restriction of export sales into Germany. While article 36
of the Treaty of Rome protects intellectual property rights,8 it
warns that agreements disguised as intellectual property rights
should not be used to divide markets arbitrarily.
The same situation would exist in Germany, where the U.S.
company would prefer to restrict sales to Germany. The German
partner would prefer to maximize sales by permitting sales into
France.
5. Wholly-Owned Subsidiaries.-The use of a wholly-owned
subsidiary as a vehicle for penetrating the EC market would seem to
79. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
80. Re the Franchise Agreement of Yves Rocher, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L8) 49
(1987), [1988] 4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 592.
81. See Pronuptia, 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 353, [1986] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 414.
82. Id.
83. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 36.
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eliminate the need to restrict cross-border sales. Because the Ameri-
can company has full control over both the French and the German
subsidiaries, the parent company can dictate sales policy to the sub-
sidiaries, without the need for a formal documentation that includes
restrictions. While unwritten policies might violate the EC regula-
tions, they are difficult to discover and to prove. A serious problem
could arise, however, if a customer in Germany wished to purchase
goods from a subsidiary other than the German subsidiary, in. order
to take advantage of price variations. For example, assume that the
American company also had a wholly-owned subsidiary in Greece,
where the labor rates are considerably lower than in Germany. If a
customer in Germany placed an order with the Greek Subsidiary
rather than the German subsidiary, the Greek subsidiary's refusal to
honor the order could be considered a form of illegal restrictive trade
practice. The situation would be especially sensitive if the American
company held a dominant position in the EC market.8 '
IV. Intellectual Property Restrictions vs. The Free Flow of Goods
Under the Single European Act
Penetration of the European market by non-European compa-
nies, through licensing, franchising, joint ventures or wholly-owned
subsidiaries, generally involves the grant of an intellectual property
license to specific licensees in different geographical areas. 85 It is
crucial to the success of the program that the licensor be able to
limit the scope of the license to the specific geographical area where
the licensee has the expertise to promote the licensor's goods or ser-
vices. As indicated, this restriction appears to be contrary to the
terms and spirit of the Single European Act,86 which seeks to elimi-
nate all cross-border restrictions on the free flow of commerce among
the member states.
A. Accommodations in Patent Licensing
1. Patent License Block Exemptions.-The EC has attempted
to accommodate the seemingly inconsistent goals of free flow of com-
merce and protection of patent rights by granting block exemptions
in certain intellectual property licenses. EC Regulation No. 1983/
83, 26 OJL 173/1 (1983)7 and Regulation 1984/83, 26 OJL 173/5
(1983)88 set forth terms and conditions of patent licenses that are
not violative of the Treaty of Rome, 89 in spite of their restrictive
84. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
86. W. KEATING, supra note 24, § 12.10.
87. 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 173) 1 (1983).
88. 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 173) 5 (1983).
89. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 1.
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effect on cross-border trade. Territorial restrictions that protect the
licensee and achieve an orderly local market are believed to promote
trade by supporting the licensee, in spite of the fact that such restric-
tions have a tendency to restrain trade." The EC has adopted a bal-
ancing test and concluded that, on balance, the benefits of the re-,
strictions outweigh their negative effects.9 1
The block exemption also lists those restrictions that are prohib-
ited from use in a license agreement.92 Clauses that constitute price
fixing or that limit production are considered so anti-competitive that
they are unjustified, even though they have some pro-competition ad-
vantages.93 Restrictive clauses that are not included on either list
may receive a special exemption if a request for approval to the EC
is submitted.9 '
In 1984 the EC issued Regulation 2349/84, 27 OJL 219/15
(1984),"' which permits the licensor of a patent license to restrict
sales by limiting the geographic scope of the license.96 The restric-
tion may be effective for a maximum term of five years, beginning
on the date when the product is first sold in the EC. 7 The licensor
may restrict the licensee's ability to solicit sales for an additional five
years, but may not prevent the licensee from accepting orders which
are received spontaneously, without solicitation. 8 In the example
discussed above, the American licensor could prohibit the French li-
censee from selling patented goods in Germany or filling orders re-
ceived spontaneously from a German customer for a period of five
years from the introduction of the products into the market. After
that time, the American licensor could prohibit the French company
from actively soliciting orders in France, but not from filling orders
initiated by German customers (referred to as "parallel importa-
tion"). 9 After the expiration of the second five-year period, the
American company could not restrain the French company from
soliciting orders in Germany. However, in a fast moving technology,
improved products might be developed, thus generating new patent
rights which would start the term over again for the new products.
90. Re the Franchise Agreements of Yves Rocher, 30 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L8) 49
(1987), [1988] 4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 592.
91. W. KEATING, supra note 24, at 396-98; see also Yves Rocher, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L8) 49 (1987), [1988] 4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 592.
92. See W. KEATING, supra note 24, at 396-98; see also Yves Rocher, 30 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L8) 49 (1987), [1988] 4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 592.
93. 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 173) 1 (1983).
94. 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 173) 5 (1983).
95. 27 OJ. EuR. COMM. (No. L 219) 15 (1984).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988).
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2. Field of Use Licensing.-While the discussion of patent li-
cense restrictions has involved geographical limitations, in a proper
case the licensor may wish to limit the licensee's field of use of the
invention to promote more efficient marketing. For example, assume
that an American manufacturer has developed a fractional horse-
power motor that controls motor speed with great precision. The de-
vice is quite useful in the recording industry, where the speed of the
tape player must match the speed of the recording device to achieve
fidelity. The device would also be useful in an entirely different field,
scientific instruments, in which precise motor drive is desirable. The
companies manufacturing scientific instruments are generally not the
same companies that manufacture audio/video recording equipment.
The royalty rate in the scientific field of use might be higher than
traditional royalty rates in the audio/video recording field of use.
Assuming the American manufacturer has perfected its patent
rights throughout the world, the licensor would prefer to license its
patents to certain manufacturers of audio/video equipment in differ-
ent geographical areas. It would also seek to license the patent to
manufacturers of scientific equipment, perhaps at a different royalty
rate from the audio/video license agreements. It would seek to pre-
vent the licensees from selling to customers outside of the designated
fields of use.100
The validity of such restrictions, within the EC, involves the
same considerations that were examined in the case of geographical
limitations on licensees. The limitations are an obvious restraint of
trade. Are the pro-competitive effects sufficiently compelling to jus-
tify the limitations?
A licensor who wants to insert such provisions in a license
agreement would be well advised to notify the Commission of its in-
tent and seek a favorable ruling that the agreement does not violate
the Treaty of Rome. If a ruling is not obtained, the licensor may
apply for an exemption, and argue that the pro-competitive effect
outweighs the disadvantages that might accrue through trade re-
straints.101 The petition for exemption should be supported by fac-
tual allegations of the advantages of the license agreements, as well
as the necessity of inserting such clauses into the license agreements
so that the licensor may achieve the benefits of the patent rights.
The petition should also contain arguments to convince the Commis-
sion that the probable restraint of trade is minimal.
100. U.P. TOEPKE, supra note 3, at 359-65.
101. Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schiligallis, 1986 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 353, [1986] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 414.
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B. Accommodations in Trademarks/Franchising
1. Approval by the European Court of Justice.-Trademark
licensing, including franchising, has been given specific approval
through the European Court of Justice, as well as through a block
exemption. In 1986 the ECJ decided a case that involved Pronuptia
de Paris,oa° and gave the franchisors the right to restrict business
operations of their franchisees in certain important respects, despite
the impeded cross-border flow of goods that resulted. Clauses regu-
lating the source of goods, location, quality control, and non-compe-
tition were held to be reasonable because they promote the franchise,
but have a minimal effect on restraint of trade.103 The court still
considered price fixing, production control and similar predatory
practices illegal.10 4 In 1989 the Commission gave the decision its
blessing by incorporating the terms of the decision into a block
exemption.105
2. Customer Restrictions.-It may be that in an appropriate
case the franchisor would prefer to reserve a particular class of cus-
tomers to itself, rather than include the class in the franchisee's cus-
tomer base. For example, the Ford Motor Company may grant a
franchisee the right to sell Ford cars to consumers in a particular
geographic area. However, it may prefer to reserve the right to make
large volume sales to a single customer (known as "fleet sales")
through the parent organization. Fleet sales to government agencies,
state police, and automobile leasing companies are sold through the
franchisor organization specializing in this type of distribution.0'6
These sales are made through competitive bidding, where the profit
margin is low because of limited expense for advertising and dealer
preparation. Even in the food service industry, the franchisee is
granted the exclusive right to serve the general public, while "insti-
tutional accounts," such as hospitals, schools, prisons, and airlines,
are served by a separate agency of the franchisor that specializes in
this type of distribution. 01
May an American franchisor insert provisions into its agree-
ments with licensees in the EC that limit the franchisees by catego-
ries of customers? Since the franchise agreement is tied to a trade-
mark license, the limitations would appear to violate the Treaty of
Rome, which prohibits such restraints of trade.
As one might expect, there is little law dealing with this specific
102. See supra note 42.
103. Pronuptia, 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 353, [1986] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 414.
104. W. KEATING, supra note 24, § 12.11.
105. 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 359) 46 (1989).
106. W. KEATING, supra note 24, § 5.23.
107. Id.
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issue, probably because franchise distribution is a fairly recent mar-
keting innovation in the EC countries.108 The franchisor should seek
a specific exemption from the EC, and detail the advantages of
franchise distribution and the need for employing such clauses, as
well as the minimal intrusion on cross-border trade. The history of
the Commission's rulings suggests that it will grant a favorable rul-
ing in a proper case. 109 If the Commission concludes, however, that
these clauses are a disguised mechanism for controlling prices or re-
straining trade, it will deny the exemption.110
C. Accommodations in Trade Secrets
The rights and limitations of trade secret licensing follows the
patent licensing block exemption, Regulation No. 556/89."1 In fact,
the patent license and trade secret license may be combined into a
single document.1 12 Again, the regulation permits five years of total
exclusivity and five years of prohibition against the solicitation of
business outside the limited area."'
D. Accommodations in Copyrights
At present, there are no specific provisions granting block ex-
emptions to copyright licenses. The cross-border control of copy-
righted performances has been the subject of numerous treaty nego-
tiations between the European countries.1 '
E. Accommodations in Joint Ventures and Wholly-Owned
Subsidiaries
The EC has approved and encouraged the formation of a busi-
ness in EC countries by direct investment.11 6 The only criterion is
that the enterprise be in the best interests of the economy of the
member state." 6 Presumably, drug cartels would not be welcome.
There is a growing sentiment in some areas that enterprises owned
by investors outside of the EC may not be in the best interests of the
local economy. Establishing a presence in an EC country before the
enactment of any regulations controlling equity participation by non-
EC nationals would be a shrewd move.
108. Id. § 12.01.
109. Id. §§ 12.10, 12.11.
110. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 36.
111. 32 0.1. EUR. COMM. (No. L 61) 1 (1989).
112. Id.
113. Schoenbaum, Storming Fortress Europe, 17 KOREAN J. COMP. L. 67, 86 (1989).
114. Id.
115. See generally Donald, supra note 49.
116. Id.
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V. Strategy
A. Realignment of Manufacturing and Distribution
Many previous corporate decisions about the location of manu-
facturing and distribution sites to serve the European market were
strongly influenced by the effect of import duties.117 While labor
rates are lower in Spain than in West Germany, the advantage
would be lost through the expense of German tariffs.118 In many
cases the cost of tariffs would dictate parallel manufacture of the
same product in both Spain and Germany. " Thus, the most efficient
method of serving the EC market was to establish joint ventures or
wholly-owned subsidiaries in each country where the enterprise in-
tended to do business.120
With the elimination of tariff barriers between the EC coun-
tries, foreign companies doing business in the EC should reconsider
whether the most efficient locations for manufacturing and distribu-
tion have changed. While Greece has a low labor rate, it lacks avail-
ability of highly skilled labor. Items that require precision manufac-
ture, such as scientific instruments, should be made in locations
where skilled labor is readily available. Mass produced products
which are primarily manufactured by machine can be fabricated in
low labor rate areas and imported into other markets. If a market
analysis proved feasible, a full service subsidiary in Germany might
be converted into a product distribution center. The product could be
manufactured in Spain, shipped in bulk to Germany, and labelled
for the German market.
B. Establishment of a Presence
While no one can predict with any certainty the short-range or
long-range effects of the Single European Act, prudence suggests
that any non-EC company with an interest in the EC market should
establish a presence in the EC, preferably before December 31,
1992.121 At the moment, it is relatively easy to establish such a pres-
ence. After 1992, penetration of the EC market is likely to become
more difficult.122 Any company with a presence in the EC before
that date will probably receive the benefit of "grandfather
117. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988). The concept of a "parallel
importation" is dependent on varying labor rates.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. AMP, Inc., ranked 161 in the Fortune "500" American companies, has eleven
wholly-owned subsidiaries in eleven different EC countries. AMP, INC.. 1987 ANNUAL REPORT
(1987).
121. Jarvis, American Business and the Single European Act, 20 CAL. WEST. INT'L L. J.
227, 252-55 (1990),
122. Id. at 265.
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clauses"' a that establish rights as of the time that the company first
began doing business in the EC and exempt it from later regulations.
VI. Conclusion
The Single European Act of 1992 will offer American
merchants a challenge and an opportunity to participate in a market
larger than the internal U.S. market. It will require an assessment of
the advantages and disadvantages of attempting to participate in
market penetration. If the vehicle used depends on intellectual prop-
erty, American companies must appreciate and understand the ten-
sion between the EC's objectives in promoting freedom of cross-bor-
der trade and the right of the intellectual property owner to control
the market through intellectual property management.
Restructuring of the commercial organization should be under-
taken with an appreciation of the cost and the effect of such revi-
sions. The best time to make these changes is prior to any move by
the EC to restrict the ability of non-EC companies to participate in
the EC internal market. The time to make these changes is NOW.
123. A "grandfather clause" permits continued operation of a practice, prospectively
made prohibited. Generally, the operations are allowed to continue to prevent hardship
through ex post facto application of a law.
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